diff options
author | Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org> | 2014-06-12 07:24:54 -0600 |
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committer | Tom Rini <trini@ti.com> | 2014-06-19 11:19:03 -0400 |
commit | c7320ed52f8e71eeadcf6b36c818b7b39321f8d4 (patch) | |
tree | 6ce568e2ee5365c78fc478c853f9ebc75890c5f3 /doc | |
parent | ce1400f6949bbfec01fe381a844b14844cb3be12 (diff) |
Add documentation for verified boot on Beaglebone Black
As an example of an end-to-end process for using verified boot in U-Boot,
add a detailed description of the steps to be used for a Beaglebone
Black.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/uImage.FIT/beaglebone_vboot.txt | 608 |
1 files changed, 608 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/uImage.FIT/beaglebone_vboot.txt b/doc/uImage.FIT/beaglebone_vboot.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b4ab28542e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/uImage.FIT/beaglebone_vboot.txt @@ -0,0 +1,608 @@ +Verified Boot on the Beaglebone Black +===================================== + +Introduction +------------ + +Before reading this, please read verified-boot.txt and signature.txt. These +instructions are for mainline U-Boot from v2014.07 onwards. + +There is quite a bit of documentation in this directory describing how +verified boot works in U-Boot. There is also a test which runs through the +entire process of signing an image and running U-Boot (sandbox) to check it. +However, it might be useful to also have an example on a real board. + +Beaglebone Black is a fairly common board so seems to be a reasonable choice +for an example of how to enable verified boot using U-Boot. + +First a note that may to help avoid confusion. U-Boot and Linux both use +device tree. They may use the same device tree source, but it is seldom useful +for them to use the exact same binary from the same place. More typically, +U-Boot has its device tree packaged wtih it, and the kernel's device tree is +packaged with the kernel. In particular this is important with verified boot, +since U-Boot's device tree must be immutable. If it can be changed then the +public keys can be changed and verified boot is useless. An attacker can +simply generate a new key and put his public key into U-Boot so that +everything verifies. On the other hand the kernel's device tree typically +changes when the kernel changes, so it is useful to package an updated device +tree with the kernel binary. U-Boot supports the latter with its flexible FIT +format (Flat Image Tree). + + +Overview +-------- + +The steps are roughly as follows: + +1. Build U-Boot for the board, with the verified boot options enabled. + +2. Obtain a suitable Linux kernel + +3. Create a Image Tree Source file (ITS) file describing how you want the +kernel to be packaged, compressed and signed. + +4. Create a key pair + +5. Sign the kernel + +6. Put the public key into U-Boot's image + +7. Put U-Boot and the kernel onto the board + +8. Try it + + +Step 1: Build U-Boot +-------------------- + +a. Set up the environment variable to point to your toolchain. You will need +this for U-Boot and also for the kernel if you build it. For example if you +installed a Linaro version manually it might be something like: + + export CROSS_COMPILE=/opt/linaro/gcc-linaro-arm-linux-gnueabihf-4.8-2013.08_linux/bin/arm-linux-gnueabihf- + +or if you just installed gcc-arm-linux-gnueabi then it might be + + export CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabi- + +b. Configure and build U-Boot with verified boot enabled: + + export ARCH=arm + export UBOOT=/path/to/u-boot + cd $UBOOT + # You can add -j10 if you have 10 CPUs to make it faster + make O=b/am335x_boneblack_vboot am335x_boneblack_vboot_config all + export UOUT=$UBOOT/b/am335x_boneblack_vboot + +c. You will now have a U-Boot image: + + file b/am335x_boneblack_vboot/u-boot-dtb.img +b/am335x_boneblack_vboot/u-boot-dtb.img: u-boot legacy uImage, U-Boot 2014.07-rc2-00065-g2f69f8, Firmware/ARM, Firmware Image (Not compressed), 395375 bytes, Sat May 31 16:19:04 2014, Load Address: 0x80800000, Entry Point: 0x00000000, Header CRC: 0x0ABD6ACA, Data CRC: 0x36DEF7E4 + + +Step 2: Build Linux +-------------------- + +a. Find the kernel image ('Image') and device tree (.dtb) file you plan to +use. In our case it is am335x-boneblack.dtb and it is built with the kernel. +At the time of writing an SD Boot image can be obtained from here: + + http://www.elinux.org/Beagleboard:Updating_The_Software#Image_For_Booting_From_microSD + +You can write this to an SD card and then mount it to extract the kernel and +device tree files. + +You can also build a kernel. Instructions for this are are here: + + http://elinux.org/Building_BBB_Kernel + +or you can use your favourite search engine. Following these instructions +produces a kernel Image and device tree files. For the record the steps were: + + export KERNEL=/path/to/kernel + cd $KERNEL + git clone git://github.com/beagleboard/kernel.git . + git checkout v3.14 + ./patch.sh + cp configs/beaglebone kernel/arch/arm/configs/beaglebone_defconfig + cd kernel + make beaglebone_defconfig + make uImage dtbs # -j10 if you have 10 CPUs + export OKERNEL=$KERNEL/kernel/arch/arm/boot + +c. You now have the 'Image' and 'am335x-boneblack.dtb' files needed to boot. + + +Step 3: Create the ITS +---------------------- + +Set up a directory for your work. + + export WORK=/path/to/dir + cd $WORK + +Put this into a file in that directory called sign.its: + +/dts-v1/; + +/ { + description = "Beaglebone black"; + #address-cells = <1>; + + images { + kernel@1 { + data = /incbin/("Image.lzo"); + type = "kernel"; + arch = "arm"; + os = "linux"; + compression = "lzo"; + load = <0x80008000>; + entry = <0x80008000>; + hash@1 { + algo = "sha1"; + }; + }; + fdt@1 { + description = "beaglebone-black"; + data = /incbin/("am335x-boneblack.dtb"); + type = "flat_dt"; + arch = "arm"; + compression = "none"; + hash@1 { + algo = "sha1"; + }; + }; + }; + configurations { + default = "conf@1"; + conf@1 { + kernel = "kernel@1"; + fdt = "fdt@1"; + signature@1 { + algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; + key-name-hint = "dev"; + sign-images = "fdt", "kernel"; + }; + }; + }; +}; + + +The explanation for this is all in the documentation you have already read. +But briefly it packages a kernel and device tree, and provides a single +configuration to be signed with a key named 'dev'. The kernel is compressed +with LZO to make it smaller. + + +Step 4: Create a key pair +------------------------- + +See signature.txt for details on this step. + + cd $WORK + mkdir keys + openssl genrsa -F4 -out keys/dev.key 2048 + openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key keys/dev.key -out keys/dev.crt + +Note: keys/dev.key contains your private key and is very secret. If anyone +gets access to that file they can sign kernels with it. Keep it secure. + + +Step 5: Sign the kernel +----------------------- + +We need to use mkimage (which was built when you built U-Boot) to package the +Linux kernel into a FIT (Flat Image Tree, a flexible file format that U-Boot +can load) using the ITS file you just created. + +At the same time we must put the public key into U-Boot device tree, with the +'required' property, which tells U-Boot that this key must be verified for the +image to be valid. You will make this key available to U-Boot for booting in +step 6. + + ln -s $OKERNEL/dts/am335x-boneblack.dtb + ln -s $OKERNEL/Image + ln -s $UOUT/u-boot-dtb.img + cp $UOUT/arch/arm/dts/am335x-boneblack.dtb am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb + lzop Image + $UOUT/tools/mkimage -f sign.its -K am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb -k keys -r image.fit + +You should see something like this: + +FIT description: Beaglebone black +Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 + Image 0 (kernel@1) + Description: unavailable + Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 + Type: Kernel Image + Compression: lzo compressed + Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7608.34 kB = 7.43 MB + Architecture: ARM + OS: Linux + Load Address: 0x80008000 + Entry Point: 0x80008000 + Hash algo: sha1 + Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988 + Image 1 (fdt@1) + Description: beaglebone-black + Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 + Type: Flat Device Tree + Compression: uncompressed + Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.81 kB = 0.03 MB + Architecture: ARM + Hash algo: sha1 + Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d + Default Configuration: 'conf@1' + Configuration 0 (conf@1) + Description: unavailable + Kernel: kernel@1 + FDT: fdt@1 + + +Now am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb contains the public key and image.fit contains +the signed kernel. Jump to step 6 if you like, or continue reading to increase +your understanding. + +You can also run fit_check_sign to check it: + + $UOUT/tools/fit_check_sign -f image.fit -k am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb + +which results in: + +Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:dev+ +## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 7fc6ee469000 ... + Using 'conf@1' configuration + Verifying Hash Integrity ... +sha1,rsa2048:dev+ +OK + + Trying 'kernel@1' kernel subimage + Description: unavailable + Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 + Type: Kernel Image + Compression: lzo compressed + Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7608.34 kB = 7.43 MB + Architecture: ARM + OS: Linux + Load Address: 0x80008000 + Entry Point: 0x80008000 + Hash algo: sha1 + Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988 + Verifying Hash Integrity ... +sha1+ +OK + +Unimplemented compression type 4 +## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 7fc6ee469000 ... + Using 'conf@1' configuration + Trying 'fdt@1' fdt subimage + Description: beaglebone-black + Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014 + Type: Flat Device Tree + Compression: uncompressed + Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.81 kB = 0.03 MB + Architecture: ARM + Hash algo: sha1 + Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d + Verifying Hash Integrity ... +sha1+ +OK + + Loading Flat Device Tree ... OK + +## Loading ramdisk from FIT Image at 7fc6ee469000 ... + Using 'conf@1' configuration +Could not find subimage node + +Signature check OK + + +At the top, you see "sha1,rsa2048:dev+". This means that it checked an RSA key +of size 2048 bits using SHA1 as the hash algorithm. The key name checked was +'dev' and the '+' means that it verified. If it showed '-' that would be bad. + +Once the configuration is verified it is then possible to rely on the hashes +in each image referenced by that configuration. So fit_check_sign goes on to +load each of the images. We have a kernel and an FDT but no ramkdisk. In each +case fit_check_sign checks the hash and prints sha1+ meaning that the SHA1 +hash verified. This means that none of the images has been tampered with. + +There is a test in test/vboot which uses U-Boot's sandbox build to verify that +the above flow works. + +But it is fun to do this by hand, so you can load image.fit into a hex editor +like ghex, and change a byte in the kernel: + + $UOUT/tools/fit_info -f image.fit -n /images/kernel@1 -p data +NAME: kernel@1 +LEN: 7790938 +OFF: 168 + +This tells us that the kernel starts at byte offset 168 (decimal) in image.fit +and extends for about 7MB. Try changing a byte at 0x2000 (say) and run +fit_check_sign again. You should see something like: + +Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:dev+ +## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 7f5a39571000 ... + Using 'conf@1' configuration + Verifying Hash Integrity ... +sha1,rsa2048:dev+ +OK + + Trying 'kernel@1' kernel subimage + Description: unavailable + Created: Sun Jun 1 13:09:21 2014 + Type: Kernel Image + Compression: lzo compressed + Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7608.34 kB = 7.43 MB + Architecture: ARM + OS: Linux + Load Address: 0x80008000 + Entry Point: 0x80008000 + Hash algo: sha1 + Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988 + Verifying Hash Integrity ... +sha1 error +Bad hash value for 'hash@1' hash node in 'kernel@1' image node +Bad Data Hash + +## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 7f5a39571000 ... + Using 'conf@1' configuration + Trying 'fdt@1' fdt subimage + Description: beaglebone-black + Created: Sun Jun 1 13:09:21 2014 + Type: Flat Device Tree + Compression: uncompressed + Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.81 kB = 0.03 MB + Architecture: ARM + Hash algo: sha1 + Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d + Verifying Hash Integrity ... +sha1+ +OK + + Loading Flat Device Tree ... OK + +## Loading ramdisk from FIT Image at 7f5a39571000 ... + Using 'conf@1' configuration +Could not find subimage node + +Signature check Bad (error 1) + + +It has detected the change in the kernel. + +You can also be sneaky and try to switch images, using the libfdt utilities +that come with dtc (package name is device-tree-compiler but you will need a +recent version like 1.4: + + dtc -v +Version: DTC 1.4.0 + +First we can check which nodes are actually hashed by the configuration: + + fdtget -l image.fit / +images +configurations + + fdtget -l image.fit /configurations +conf@1 +fdtget -l image.fit /configurations/conf@1 +signature@1 + + fdtget -p image.fit /configurations/conf@1/signature@1 +hashed-strings +hashed-nodes +timestamp +signer-version +signer-name +value +algo +key-name-hint +sign-images + + fdtget image.fit /configurations/conf@1/signature@1 hashed-nodes +/ /configurations/conf@1 /images/fdt@1 /images/fdt@1/hash@1 /images/kernel@1 /images/kernel@1/hash@1 + +This gives us a bit of a look into the signature that mkimage added. Note you +can also use fdtdump to list the entire device tree. + +Say we want to change the kernel that this configuration uses +(/images/kernel@1). We could just put a new kernel in the image, but we will +need to change the hash to match. Let's simulate that by changing a byte of +the hash: + + fdtget -tx image.fit /images/kernel@1/hash@1 value +c9436464 6427e10f 423837e5 59898ef0 2c97b988 + fdtput -tx image.fit /images/kernel@1/hash@1 value c9436464 6427e10f 423837e5 59898ef0 2c97b981 + +Now check it again: + + $UOUT/tools/fit_check_sign -f image.fit -k am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb +Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:devrsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13 +rsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13 +- +Failed to verify required signature 'key-dev' +Signature check Bad (error 1) + +This time we don't even get as far as checking the images, since the +configuration signature doesn't match. We can't change any hashes without the +signature check noticing. The configuration is essentially locked. U-Boot has +a public key for which it requires a match, and will not permit the use of any +configuration that does not match that public key. The only way the +configuration will match is if it was signed by the matching private key. + +It would also be possible to add a new signature node that does match your new +configuration. But that won't work since you are not allowed to change the +configuration in any way. Try it with a fresh (valid) image if you like by +running the mkimage link again. Then: + + fdtput -p image.fit /configurations/conf@1/signature@2 value fred + $UOUT/tools/fit_check_sign -f image.fit -k am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb +Verifying Hash Integrity ... - +sha1,rsa2048:devrsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13 +rsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13 +- +Failed to verify required signature 'key-dev' +Signature check Bad (error 1) + + +Of course it would be possible to add an entirely new configuration and boot +with that, but it still needs to be signed, so it won't help. + + +6. Put the public key into U-Boot's image +----------------------------------------- + +Having confirmed that the signature is doing its job, let's try it out in +U-Boot on the board. U-Boot needs access to the public key corresponding to +the private key that you signed with so that it can verify any kernels that +you sign. + + cd $UBOOT + make O=b/am335x_boneblack_vboot EXT_DTB=${WORK}/am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb + +Here we are overrriding the normal device tree file with our one, which +contains the public key. + +Now you have a special U-Boot image with the public key. It can verify can +kernel that you sign with the private key as in step 5. + +If you like you can take a look at the public key information that mkimage +added to U-Boot's device tree: + + fdtget -p am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb /signature/key-dev +required +algo +rsa,r-squared +rsa,modulus +rsa,n0-inverse +rsa,num-bits +key-name-hint + +This has information about the key and some pre-processed values which U-Boot +can use to verify against it. These values are obtained from the public key +certificate by mkimage, but require quite a bit of code to generate. To save +code space in U-Boot, the information is extracted and written in raw form for +U-Boot to easily use. The same mechanism is used in Google's Chrome OS. + +Notice the 'required' property. This marks the key as required - U-Boot will +not boot any image that does not verify against this key. + + +7. Put U-Boot and the kernel onto the board +------------------------------------------- + +The method here varies depending on how you are booting. For this example we +are booting from an micro-SD card with two partitions, one for U-Boot and one +for Linux. Put it into your machine and write U-Boot and the kernel to it. +Here the card is /dev/sde: + + cd $WORK + export UDEV=/dev/sde1 # Change thes two lines to the correct device + export KDEV=/dev/sde2 + sudo mount $UDEV /mnt/tmp && sudo cp $UOUT/u-boot-dtb.img /mnt/tmp/u-boot.img && sleep 1 && sudo umount $UDEV + sudo mount $KDEV /mnt/tmp && sudo cp $WORK/image.fit /mnt/tmp/boot/image.fit && sleep 1 && sudo umount $KDEV + + +8. Try it +--------- + +Boot the board using the commands below: + + setenv bootargs console=ttyO0,115200n8 quiet root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 ro rootfstype=ext4 rootwait + ext2load mmc 0:2 82000000 /boot/image.fit + bootm 82000000 + +You should then see something like this: + +U-Boot# setenv bootargs console=ttyO0,115200n8 quiet root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 ro rootfstype=ext4 rootwait +U-Boot# ext2load mmc 0:2 82000000 /boot/image.fit +7824930 bytes read in 589 ms (12.7 MiB/s) +U-Boot# bootm 82000000 +## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 82000000 ... + Using 'conf@1' configuration + Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:dev+ OK + Trying 'kernel@1' kernel subimage + Description: unavailable + Created: 2014-06-01 19:32:54 UTC + Type: Kernel Image + Compression: lzo compressed + Data Start: 0x820000a8 + Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7.4 MiB + Architecture: ARM + OS: Linux + Load Address: 0x80008000 + Entry Point: 0x80008000 + Hash algo: sha1 + Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988 + Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1+ OK +## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 82000000 ... + Using 'conf@1' configuration + Trying 'fdt@1' fdt subimage + Description: beaglebone-black + Created: 2014-06-01 19:32:54 UTC + Type: Flat Device Tree + Compression: uncompressed + Data Start: 0x8276e2ec + Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.8 KiB + Architecture: ARM + Hash algo: sha1 + Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d + Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1+ OK + Booting using the fdt blob at 0x8276e2ec + Uncompressing Kernel Image ... OK + Loading Device Tree to 8fff5000, end 8ffffb3a ... OK + +Starting kernel ... + +[ 0.582377] omap_init_mbox: hwmod doesn't have valid attrs +[ 2.589651] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.0.auto: Failed to request rx1. +[ 2.595830] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.0.auto: musb_init_controller failed with status -517 +[ 2.606470] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.1.auto: Failed to request rx1. +[ 2.612723] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.1.auto: musb_init_controller failed with status -517 +[ 2.940808] drivers/rtc/hctosys.c: unable to open rtc device (rtc0) +[ 7.248889] libphy: PHY 4a101000.mdio:01 not found +[ 7.253995] net eth0: phy 4a101000.mdio:01 not found on slave 1 +systemd-fsck[83]: Angstrom: clean, 50607/218160 files, 306348/872448 blocks + +.---O---. +| | .-. o o +| | |-----.-----.-----.| | .----..-----.-----. +| | | __ | ---'| '--.| .-'| | | +| | | | | |--- || --'| | | ' | | | | +'---'---'--'--'--. |-----''----''--' '-----'-'-'-' + -' | + '---' + +The Angstrom Distribution beaglebone ttyO0 + +Angstrom v2012.12 - Kernel 3.14.1+ + +beaglebone login: + +At this point your kernel has been verified and you can be sure that it is one +that you signed. As an exercise, try changing image.fit as in step 5 and see +what happens. + + +Further Improvements +-------------------- + +Several of the steps here can be easily automated. In particular it would be +capital if signing and packaging a kernel were easy, perhaps a simple make +target in the kernel. + +Some mention of how to use multiple .dtb files in a FIT might be useful. + +U-Boot's verified boot mechanism has not had a robust and independent security +review. Such a review should look at the implementation and its resistance to +attacks. + +Perhaps the verified boot feature could could be integrated into the Amstrom +distribution. + + +Simon Glass +sjg@chromium.org +2-June-14 |