diff options
| author | AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> | 2020-04-14 11:51:44 +0900 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> | 2020-04-16 08:12:46 +0200 |
| commit | 4540dabdcacaea50bf874115f28adc103966d25a (patch) | |
| tree | e597a3d1c790760d4d5893da98c39b6fe2e494b7 /lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | |
| parent | 8353516f4a7e31ee655050033b65218c9733c65a (diff) | |
efi_loader: image_loader: support image authentication
With this commit, image validation can be enforced, as UEFI specification
section 32.5 describes, if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is enabled.
Currently we support
* authentication based on db and dbx,
so dbx-validated image will always be rejected.
* following signature types:
EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images)
EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images)
Timestamp-based certificate revocation is not supported here.
Internally, authentication data is stored in one of certificates tables
of PE image (See efi_image_parse()) and will be verified by
efi_image_authenticate() before loading a given image.
It seems that UEFI specification defines the verification process
in a bit ambiguous way. I tried to implement it as closely to as
EDK2 does.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c index 3b79a88a48..a3f11eaf62 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c @@ -1882,12 +1882,12 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_load_image(bool boot_policy, efi_dp_split_file_path(file_path, &dp, &fp); ret = efi_setup_loaded_image(dp, fp, image_obj, &info); if (ret == EFI_SUCCESS) - ret = efi_load_pe(*image_obj, dest_buffer, info); + ret = efi_load_pe(*image_obj, dest_buffer, source_size, info); if (!source_buffer) /* Release buffer to which file was loaded */ efi_free_pages((uintptr_t)dest_buffer, efi_size_in_pages(source_size)); - if (ret == EFI_SUCCESS) { + if (ret == EFI_SUCCESS || ret == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { info->system_table = &systab; info->parent_handle = parent_image; } else { @@ -2885,10 +2885,16 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_start_image(efi_handle_t image_handle, EFI_ENTRY("%p, %p, %p", image_handle, exit_data_size, exit_data); + if (!efi_search_obj(image_handle)) + return EFI_EXIT(EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + /* Check parameters */ if (image_obj->header.type != EFI_OBJECT_TYPE_LOADED_IMAGE) return EFI_EXIT(EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + if (image_obj->auth_status != EFI_IMAGE_AUTH_PASSED) + return EFI_EXIT(EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION); + ret = EFI_CALL(efi_open_protocol(image_handle, &efi_guid_loaded_image, &info, NULL, NULL, EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL)); |